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Regulating Television Advertising in the
European Community and United States:
Preventing Harm to Children
Daniel E. Frankt
Both the United States and the European Community ("EC")
regulate broadcasting and broadcast advertising. The Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC") is charged with the duty of
regulating broadcasters in the United States.1 In the EC, .the
Council Directive of October 3, 1989 on television broadcast activities provides the regulatory framework for freedom of broadcasting, but also contains provisions to limit the potentially harmful
effects of unregulated broadcasting.2 In particular, Article 16 of
this Directive seeks to protect children from "moral or physical
detriment" and provides a number of criteria that television advertising must meet.
The issue of regulating television advertising bears exploration, especially in light of Congress' recent enactment of the Children's Television Act of 1990 ("CTA").3 This measure seeks to protect children from harm by limiting the amount of advertising that
may be presented during children's television programming." Other
t B.A. 1990, University of Washington; J.D. Candidate 1993, University of Chicago.
Communications Act of 1934, 47 USC §§ 303, 307, 309 (1988).
2 Council Dir 89/552, 1989 OJ L298:23 (On the coordination of certain provisions laid
down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the pursuit
of television broadcasting activities) ("Directive").
Articles 10 through 21 of the Directive govern television advertising and sponsorship.
More specifically, Article 12 provides that
Television advertising shall not:
(a) prejudice respect for human dignity[;]
(b) include any discrimination on grounds of race, sex or nationality;
(c) be offensive to religious or political beliefs;
(d) encourage behaviour prejudicial to health or to safety;
(e) encourage behaviour prejudicial to the protection of the environment.
Article 13 prohibits the advertising of tobacco products, Article 14 prohibits the advertising
of certain medicinal products, and Article 15 regulates the advertising of alcohol on
television.
Pub L No 101-437, 104 Stat 996 (1990), to be codified at 47 USC §§ 303a-303b, 394.
Id, § 102, 104 Stat at 996-97. The Act directs the FCC to "prescribe standards applicable to commercial television broadcast licensees with respect to the time devoted to commercial matter in conjunction with children's television programming." Id, § 102(a), 104
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measures designed to protect young viewers, such as the FCC's total ban on the broadcast of "indecent" material, have not withstood legal challenge. In comparison, the European Community's
Article 16 represents an alternative, superior approach to protecting children from the harmful effects of television advertising.
This Comment argues that no constitutional impediment bars
the United States from enacting its own version of Article 16. Part
I of the Comment sets forth the particulars of Article 16 and examines its underlying policies. Part II explores the regulation of children's television in the United States, focusing on the CTA and
recent FCC actions. Part III describes the constitutional limits
placed on the regulation of television advertising. Finally, Part IV
argues that despite these limits, the United States could constitutionally enact its own version of Article 16.
I.

ARTICLE

16

OF THE "TELEVISION WITHOUT FRONTIERS"
DIRECTIVE

The EC adopted the "Television without Frontiers" Directive
on October 3, 1989. Article 16 of this Directive provides that
Television advertising shall not cause moral or physical detriment to minors, and shall therefore comply with
the following criteria for their protection:
(a) it shall not directly exhort minors to buy a product or a service by exploiting their inexperience or
credulity;
(b) it shall not directly encourage minors to persuade
their parents or others to purchase the goods or services
being advertised;
(c) it shall not exploit the special trust minors place
in parents, teachers or other persons;
(d) it shall not unreasonably show minors in dangerous situations.6
Thus, Article 16 protects children by regulating the content of television advertising.

Stat at 996. Under the Act, advertising in children's television programming is limited to no
more than ten and one-half minutes per hour on weekends and no more than twelve minutes per hour on weekdays. Id, § 102(b), 104 Stat at 996-97.
6 Action for Children's Television v FCC, 932 F2d 1504, 1510 (DC Cir 1991) (remanding the regulation to the FCC for reconsideration).
' Council Dir 89/552, art 16 1989 OJ at L298:28-29 (cited in note 2).
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The Directive promotes the objectives of the Treaty of Rome
("EEC Treaty"), including establishing closer relations between
the peoples and states of the European Economic Community,
guaranteeing economic and social progress by eliminating divisive
trade barriers, and improving the living conditions of the peoples
of the European Economic Community.' The Directive also seeks
to ensure "cultural diversity" 8 and "pluralism." 9 Guaranteeing
freedom of broadcast is one means of securing these objectives10
and, more generally, of protecting freedom of expression."
The Directive does not allow unhindered broadcasting,
though. It also articulates a commitment to the interests of consumers as television viewers. 12 Rules for television programs and
television advertising are necessary to protect the physical, mental,
and moral development of children."
In the proposal stage, the Commission sought to limit broadcast advertising in order to prevent advertisers from displacing the
informational, educational, cultural, and entertainment functions
of radio and television. 4 The Commission found that "advertisements can unduly influence younger people if special standards are
not laid down to prevent it"'" and that the "general interest" warrants protecting children's physical, mental, and moral development. 6 The Economic and Social Committee, while expressing
some concerns over a number of the Directive's provisions, highlighted the same four basic functions of broadcasting. 1 7 The Com-

Id, 1st recital, 1989 OJ at L298:23.
' Id, 13th recital, 1989 OJ at L298:24.
Id, 16th recital, 1989 OJ at L298:24.
10 Council Dir 89/552, 3d recital, 1989 OJ at L298:23 (cited in note 2).
Id, 8th recital, 1989 OJ at L298:23.
Id, 27th recital, 1989 OJ at L298:25, "[i]n order to ensure that the interests of consumers as television viewers are fully and properly protected, it is essential for television
advertising to be subject to a certain number of minimum rules and standards." This recital
also highlights the need for Member States to be able to enact more detailed or stricter
rules.
" Id, 32d recital, 1989 OJ at L298:25.
" Amended Prop for a Council Dir on the coordination of certain provisions laid down
by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the pursuit of
broadcasting activities, 36th recital, 1988 OJ C110:3, 9.
1" Id, 36th recital, 1988 OJ at C110:9.
10 Id, 44th recital, 1988 OJ at C110:10.
1
Opinion of the Economic & Social Committee on the Prop for a Council Dir on the
"

"

coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in
Member States concerning the pursuit of broadcasting activities, 1987 OJ C232:29. The
Committee "endorsfed] the rules of conduct on broadcast advertising directed at children
and young persons," but had "doubts about the practical application of vaguely worded
provisions and effective monitoring of their observance." Id, 2.16, 1987 OJ at C232:32.
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mittee also suggested "systematic consumer education" by Member States as an additional means of teaching children to view
television advertising critically.18
Thus, Article 16's four primary objectives are as follows: (1) to
ensure diversity of information and opinion through freedom of
broadcast; (2) to prevent retardation of the physical, mental, and
moral development of children; (3) to ensure that broadcasters
continue to provide informational, educational, cultural, and entertainment programming; and (4) to preserve program quality.
II. THE CHILDREN'S TELEVISION ACT OF 1990 AND THE FCC
In the United States, concerns similar to those of the EC have
also informed federal regulation of television broadcasting. The
FCC has adopted regulations1 9 implementing the provisions of the
CTA,2 0 and it has attempted, unsuccessfully, to ban the broadcast
of "indecent" material. Examining both the legislative history of
the CTA and the FCC's attempted ban of "indecent" material
reveals the policies driving regulation of television advertising in
the United States.
A.

The Children's Television Act of 1990

On October 18, 1990, the CTA became law without the President's signature. 2 The Act sets standards for children's television
programming, requires the FCC to consider a license renewal applicant's compliance with those standards, 23 and establishes an endowment for educational television.24

Thus, for example, as more "binding" and "precise" rules, the Committee suggested banning commercial interruptions of children's programs and advertisements of toy weapons.

Id.
,"Id, 1 2.25, 1987 OJ at C232:33.
"SFCC, Final Rule, Children's Television Programming, 56 Fed Reg 19611 (1991); FCC,
Final Rule, Correction, 56 Fed Reg 28824 (1991).
'0 Children's Television Act of 1990, Pub L No 101-437, 104 Stat 996 (1990), to be
codified at 47 USC §§ 303a, 303b, 394.
21 Statement on the Children's Television Act of 1990, 26 Weekly Comp Pres Doc 1611
(Oct 17, 1990).
"2These standards consist of limits on the amount of broadcast time available to advertisers. See note 4.
" Children's Television Act, § 103, 104 Stat at 997. In reviewing broadcast license renewal applications, the FCC must consider the extent to which the licensee has complied
with the standards and has "served the educational and informational needs of children
through the licensee's overall programming." Id, § 103(a), 104 Stat at 997.
24 Id, Title II, §§ 201-203, 104 Stat at 997-1000.
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These measures were based on congressional findings26 that
"television can assist children to learn important information,
skills, values, and behavior, '2 6 that "as part of their obligation to
serve the public interest" television broadcasters should "provide
programming that serves the special needs of children, 27 that "the
financial support of advertisers assists in the provision of programming to children,
and that "special safeguards are appropriate
2' 9
to protect children from overcommercialization on television.
Congress also found that "total reliance on marketplace forces
is neither sufficient nor justified to protect children from potential
exploitation by advertising or commercial practices." 30 Indeed,
much "scientific evidence" demonstrates that "children are
uniquely susceptible to the persuasive messages contained in television advertising," due to their lack of "perceptual capabilities to
consistently discriminate program from commercial content" and
lack of "ability to recognize the persuasive intent that necessarily
underlies all television advertising. 3 1 Since children cannot distinguish programming from advertising, they cannot
turn the channel
3 2
advertising.
excessive
with
when confronted
28 Relevant legislative hearings include Children's Television Act of 1989, Hearing on S

707 and S 1215 before the Subcommittee on Communications of the Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 101st Cong, 1st Sess (July 12, 1989); Children's
Television, Hearing on HR 1677 before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Fi-

nance of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong, 1st Sess (Apr 6,
1989); Commercialization of Children's Television, Hearings on HR 3288, HR 3966, and HR
4125 before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong, 1st Sess (Sep 15, 1987, Mar 17, 1988); Children's
Television Programming, Hearings on HR 3216 before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong, 1st Sess (Oct 25, 28, 1985).
" Children's Television Act § 101(1), 104 Stat at 996.
" Id, § 101(2).
28 Id, § 101(3).
89 Id, § 101(4).
" Children's Television Act of 1990, H Rep No 101-385, 101st Cong, 2d Sess 6 (Nov 21,
1989).
31 Id.
32 See id. Psychologists, scientists, and others also testified that children lack the ability to recognize the persuasive, intent implicit in advertising; that children cannot, due to
their lack of cognitive ability, distinguish between programming and advertising; and that,
therefore, children are inherently vulnerable to televised commercials. See Commercialization of Children's Television, Hearings on HR 3288, HR 3966, and HR 4125 before the
House Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance, 100th Cong, 1st Sess at 95-108,
(Sep 15, 1987) (statement of Dale L. Kunkel, Ph.D.); id (Mar 17, 1988) (testimony of Ellen
Wartella, research associate professor) (cited in note 25).
Broadcasters and advertisers disagreed with the majority report, but failed to marshal
much evidence in support of their positions. Their meager evidence consisted of assertions
that advertising was not harmful, that children had advertising savvy, and that advertising
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Moreover, Congress found that because children watch many
hours of television,3 3 broadcasters have the capability to "provid[e]
unique and positive education opportunities."8" Thus, children's
television should do more than sell products; it should educate and
inform. An unregulated television marketplace will not ensure this.
Opponents of the Act criticized these findings. 8 They noted
the lack of "evidence to indicate precisely if or how excessive commercialization causes harm to children."3 " They also questioned
the need for legally imposed limits on advertising, noting that
some studies showed that broadcasters already follow voluntary
limits. 7 Finally, these opponents suggested that instead of imposing restrictions on broadcasters, encouraging more programming
for children would adequately address the "root concerns of children's TV advocates-improving the programming watched by the
children of our Nation."3 "
Despite this opposition and without contributing its views to
this policy analysis, the FCC issued regulations implementing the
Act. 9 The four main objectives underlying enactment the Children's Television Act of 1990 may thus be summarized as follows:
(1) television should first serve the educational and informational

had no appreciable effect on the relationship between child and parent. See, for example, id
at 99-108 (comments of the American Association of Advertising Agencies). See also, David
S. Versfelt, Constitutional Considerations of the Children's Television Act of 1988: Why
the President's Veto Was Warranted, 11 Hastings Comm & Ent L J 625, 634-35 (1989).
11 "By the time the average child is 18 years old, he or she has spent between 10,000 to
15,000 hours watching television, and has been exposed to more than 200,000 commercials.
On average, a child spends more time watching television than he or she spends in school."
H Rep No 101-385 at 5 (cited in note 30).
34 Id.
11Id at 19-22 (Opponents of the Act objected to it "because it is unconstitutional, because it is unnecessary, and because it will not improve the television our children watch.").
President Bush also expressed his reservations, but he allowed the CTA to become law without his signature. The President said that although he "wholeheartedly support[ed]" the
goals of the Act, he believed that the First Amendment requires the government to leave
viewing and listening decisions to the individual and that restricting the amount of advertising would diminish broadcaster revenues, thereby reducing the quantity and quality of children's television. Statement on the Children's Television Act of 1990, 26 Weekly Comp Pres
Doc 1611-12 (Oct 17, 1990) (cited in note 21). See also, American Booksellers Ass'n., Inc. v
Hudnut, 771 F2d 323, 327 (7th Cir 1985) ("Under the First Amendment, the government
must leave to the people the evaluation of ideas.").
36 H Rep No 101-385 at 19 (cited in note 30).
Id at 20-21.
38 Id at 22.
" FCC, Proposed Rule, 55 Fed Reg 50335 (1990); FCC, Final Rule, 56 Fed Reg 19611
(1991). See also, FCC, Final Rule, Correction, 56 Fed Reg 28824 (1991); FCC, Petitions for
Reconsideration of Final Rule, 56 Fed Reg 42707 (1991) (petitions denied); FCC, Extension
of Effective Date, 56 Fed Reg 48736 (1991) (effective date extended to Jan 1, 1992).
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needs of children; (2) advertising revenue should help finance children's programming; (3) the FCC should promulgate measures to
protect children from overcommercialization; and (4) regulations
should discipline the market, since children are not capable of distinguishing advertising from programming.
B. The FCC's Attempted Ban of "Indecent" Broadcasts
Prior to enactment of the CTA, the FCC demonstrated its
commitment to protecting children viewers in a different way; it
attempted to ban the broadcast of "indecent" programs. The policy analysis that drove the FCC to adopt such a ban-although not
directly aimed at advertising-nonetheless seems to have informed
(and continues to inform) much of the debate regarding the regulation of television advertising in the United States. Thus, a brief
examination of the policies behind the FCC's attempted ban
should help develop a deeper understanding of the concerns motivating regulators in this context.
The United States has a long history of regulating "indecent"
speech.4 ° Federal law prohibits the broadcast of "any obscene, indecent, or profane language.

' 41

Although the courts have never au-

thoritatively defined the term "indecent," the FCC has ruled that
it means "language that describes, in terms patently offensive as
measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast
' The FCC's
medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs."42
primary goal in restricting the broadcast of indecent material has
been to protect children from "language which most parents regard
' Initially, it sought to accomas inappropriate for them to hear."43
plish this by permitting the broadcast of indecent material only in
the late evening hours.""
The FCC altered course in 1987. Based on its findings that
children might be in viewing audiences even late at night, the FCC
instituted a complete ban on the broadcast of "indecent" mate-

40

For a summary, see Enforcement of ProhibitionsAgainst Broadcast Indecency in 18

U.S.C. § 1464: Report of the Commission, 5 FCC Rec 5297, 5298 (1990).
41 18 USC § 1464 (1988).
4
Pacifica Foundation, 56 FCC2d 94, 98 (1975).
43 Id.
41 In re Infinity Broadcasting Corp. of Pennsylvania, 3 FCC Rec 930 (1987).
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rial." This ban did not withstand legal challenge, however,
and the
46
D.C. Circuit directed the FCC to revise its policy.
Congress responded by enacting a law that directed the FCC
to issue regulations banning "indecent" broadcasts on a 24-hour
basis. 4 7 The FCC complied, 4 and to avoid further judicial interference, it compiled a record that attempted to show that the government's interest was "compelling" and that the regulation was a
"narrowly tailored" means of realizing this interest.4 9
The FCC relied on three findings to conclude that the government's interest was "compelling." 50 First, it found that facilitating
or assisting parental supervision of children is a compelling governmental interest.5 1 Second, it found that the government had an independent, compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological welfare and development of children. 5 Third, the FCC
found that "preserving the privacy of the home provides an alter-

4' New Indecency Enforcement Standards to be Applied to All Broadcast and Amateur Radio Licensees, 2 FCC Rec 2726 (1987) (summary of new FCC policies). See also, In
re Infinity Broadcasting,3 FCC Rec at 937 n 47.

" Action for Children's Television v FCC, 852 F2d 1332, 1344 (DC Cir 1988).
41 See Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies, Appropriations, Pub L No 100-459, § 608, 102 Stat 2228 (1988); Enforcement of
Prohibitions Against Broadcast Obscenity and Indecency in 18 U.S.C. § 1464, 4 FCC Rec
457 (1988), codified at 47 CFR § 73.3999 (1990) (restrictions on the transmission of obscene
or indecent language).
48 See Enforcement of ProhibitionsAgainst Broadcast Obscenity and Indecency in 18

U.S.C. § 1464, 4 FCC Rec 457 (1988) (cited in note 47).
" See Enforcement of ProhibitionsAgainst Broadcast Indecency in 18 U.S.C. § 1464:
Notice of Inquiry, 4 FCC Rec 8358 (1989). See also, Enforcement of Prohibitions Against
Broadcast Indecency in 18 U.S.C. § 1464, 5 FCC Rec 5297 (1990) (comprehensive FCC
report finding that a complete ban on indecent broadcasts was constitutional).
" 5 FCC Rec at 5299-5300.
" Id at 5299, citing Ginsberg v New York, 390 US 629, 639-40 (1968), and FCC v
Pacifica Foundation, 438 US 726, 749-50 (1978).
" Enforcement of Prohibitions Against Broadcast Indecency in 18 U.S.C. § 1464, 5
FCC Rec at 5299 (cited in note 49) (citing New York v Ferber, 458 US 747, 756-57 (1982),
and Ginsberg, 390 US at 640).
The FCC has recognized for many years that the basis for protecting children is their
inexperience and youth:
It is a matter of common understanding that, because of their youth and inexperience, children are far more trusting of and vulnerable to commercial "pitches"
than adults. There is, in addition, evidence that very young children cannot distinguish conceptually between programming and advertising; they do not understand that the purpose of a commercial is to sell a product.
Children's Television Report and Policy Statement, 50 FCC2d 1, 11 (1974). Broadcasters,
of course, dispute this evidence. Id at 29-30.
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native basis for upholding the constitutionality of the 24-hour prohibition" on indecent broadcasts.5 3
The FCC also determined that the blanket prohibition was a
"narrowly tailored" means of protecting children. After examining
children's listening and viewing habits," ' the FCC found that television and radio broadcasts reach unsupervised children at all
times of day and night.5 5 It, therefore, concluded that the unique
pervasiveness and accessibility to children of broadcasting justified
banning indecent programming.5 6
After exploring the various alternatives to a blanket prohibition, the FCC ruled that none of these would effectively protect
children from indecency. 7 The FCC also found that a flat prohibition on the broadcast of indecent material would not impose children's programming on adults, as indecent material could be obtained elsewhere. 58 Thus, the FCC concluded that a flat

13 Enforcement of ProhibitionsAgainst Broadcast Indecency,
5 FCC Rec at 5300 (cited
in note 49).
84 Id at 5301-06.
66 Id at 5304. The FCC ruled, however, that broadcasters could rebut, on a case-by-case

basis, the finding that children were present in viewing audiences at all times. Id at 5309.
The FCC also rejected the argument that since parents were often "present" when children were viewing television broadcasts, the children were therefore supervised since their
parent(s) had the "opportunity to supervise." Enforcement of ProhibitionsAgainst Broadcast Indecency, 5 FCC Rec at 5304 (cited in note 49). The "mere 'presence' in the same
house as a child does not necessarily translate into supervision." Id at 5305. Furthermore,
"the pervasiveness and accessibility of television and radio, coupled with the lack of effective parental control mechanisms . . . make effective parental supervision exceedingly difficult if not impossible for the average parent." Id. The number of televisions in a household,
the use of VCRs for time-delayed viewing, and lack of "readily available" technical devices
to block television broadcasts supported the FCC's position. Id. Only by "co-viewing" or "at
a minimum, by remaining actively aware of what their children are watching at all times"
can parents effectively supervise children's television viewing. Id.
66 Enforcement of ProhibitionsAgainst Broadcast Indecency, 5 FCC Rec at 5301 (cited
in note 49). Broadcasting also reaches children who do not read. Id at 5302.
" Enforcement of Prohibitions Against Broadcast Indecency, 5 FCC Rec at 5306-08
(cited in note 49). The FCC discussed various options. First, it rejected time channeling-which would establish a specific time period during which indecent broadcasts could be
shown-because children are in broadcast audiences at all times and have access to VCRs.
Id at 5306-07. Second, the FCC also rejected ratings and warnings that would air prior to
broadcast and would also appear in television guides. Id at 5307. It found these ineffective
because children "graze," or randomly scan the available television channels; because prior
warnings can be missed, they would not serve their purpose. Id. Further, although the FCC
offered no explanation for this, it suggested that indecency ratings might actually attract
children despite warnings. Third and finally, the FCC rejected scrambling and decoding devices, because it found that "no such technologies are currently available to the public for
this purpose." Id at 5308.
"' Enforcement of ProhibitionsAgainst Broadcast Indecency, 5 FCC Rec at 5308 (cited
in note 49), citing Butler v Michigan, 352 US 380, 383 (1957). The FCC found that "indecent material is available on media that are largely indistinguishable, from the viewer's per-
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prohibition, applied exclusively to television, would withstand
First Amendment challenge.19
An "amalgam of broadcasters, industry associations, and public interest groups" challenged the new ban,6 0 and the D.C. Circuit
again invalidated it.6 1 While recognizing the government's interest
in protecting children from physical and psychological harm, the
court interpreted its prior ruling to mean that the FCC could not
ban indecent broadcasts entirely. 2 An absolute prohibition,
whether enacted by Congress or promulgated by the FCC, "cannot
withstand constitutional scrutiny."6 "
III.

CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON COMMERCIAL SPEECH

The First Amendment does not prohibit all restrictions placed
on the freedom of speech. For example, the First Amendment affords less protection to speech likely to reach and harm children
than to some other types of speech.6 ' Commercial speech, defined
as "expression related solely to the economic interests of the
speaker and its audience" or speech that proposes an economic
transaction, can also be regulated constitutionally.6 5
The controlling commercial speech case is Central Hudson
Gas and Electric Corporation v Public Service Commission of
New York. 66 While noting that commercial speech provides consumers with useful information, the Court in this case concluded
that the First Amendment
accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to
other constitutionally guaranteed expression. . . . The
spective, from broadcast television, although their characteristics facilitate restricting access
to adults"-for example, video cassettes, cable television, and cinema movies. Id at 5308.
" Broadcasting, unlike other media, has "specific characteristics" that render it most
suitable to regulation. Id at 5302. The FCC also cited FCC v Pacifica Foundation, 438 US
726, 748 (1978), and Sable Communications of California v FCC, 492 US 115, 127 (1989),
for the proposition that broadcasting's "pervasive presence" and its unique ability to intrude in the privacy of the home subjected it to legitimate constitutional regulation.
00 Action for Children's Television v FCC, 932 F2d 1504, 1507 (DC Cir 1991).
01 Id at 1509.
62 Id.

"' Id at 1509-10. The court directed the FCC to resume proceedings to determine during what times indecent material may be broadcast. Id. The FCC has not taken any subsequent action, although the Supreme Court has denied certiorari. 1992 US Lexis 1420 (Mar 2,
1992),
" FCC v Pacifica Foundation, 438 US 726.(1978).
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v Public Service Comm'n. of New York, 447 US
557, 561-62 (1980), citing Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
425 US 748, 762 (1976).
60 447 US 557.
0"

3991

REGULATING TELEVISION ADVERTISING
protection available for particular commercial expression
turns on the nature both of the expression and of the
governmental interests served by its regulation. 7

Relying on the "informational function of advertising," 8 the
Court articulated a four-prong test to determine the validity of
commercial speech restrictions."' First, to warrant constitutional
protection, commercial speech must be "neither misleading nor related to unlawful activity. ' 70 Second, the government's interest in
regulating the speech must be "substantial. '71 Third, the restriction "must directly advance the state interest involved. ' 72 Finally,
there must be a fairly tight fit between the means employed and
the ends sought.7 3 The government bears the burden of proving
that it has satisfied the substantial interest, direct advancement,
74
and means-ends fit prongs of the Central Hudson test.
Recent cases suggest that the Supreme Court has become
more trusting of legislative judgment with respect to the meansends fit requirement. In Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v
Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico,75 the Court upheld restrictions on the
advertising of gambling in Puerto Rico. Advertisers challenging the
restrictions argued that the government should "reduce demand
for casino gambling among the residents of Puerto Rico not by
suppressing commercial speech that might encourage such gambling, but by promulgating additional speech designed to discourage it. '7 6 The Court, however, stated that "it is up to the legislature to decide whether or not such a 'counterspeech' policy would
be as effective in reducing the demand for casino gambling as a
restriction on advertising. ' 77 Thus, the legislature is not limited to

e Id at 562-63.
68 Id at 563.
66 Id at 563-66.
70 Central Hudson, 447 US at 564. If the speech is misleading or related to unlawful
activity, the government may regulate it without "constitutional objection." Id at 563.
7' Id at 564.
72 Id at 564. In applying the test, the Court held that this prong was met when it found
a "direct link" between the state interest and the restriction. Id at 569.
73 Central Hudson, 447 US at 564 ("[I]f the governmental interest could be served as
well by a more limited restriction on commercial speech, the excessive restrictions cannot
survive."). Thus, the restriction must be "no more extensive than necessary to further the
State's interest." Id at 569-70.
7'
76
76

77

Id, 447 US at 564.
478 US 328 (1986).
Id at 344 (emphasis in original).
Id.
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countering potentially harmful commercial speech with its own
speech; it may also prohibit harmful speech entirely."8
Moreover, in Board of Trustees of the State University of
New York v Fox,79 the Court declared the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test to be a reasonable fit test, "something short of a
least-restrictive-means standard."8 0 Thus, the Court appears to be
moving in the direction of Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Central
Hudson, in which he argues that requiring too tight a fit between
means and ends would "unduly impair a state legislature's ability
to adopt legislation reasonably designed to promote interests that
have always been rightly thought to be of great importance to the
State.""1

Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court in Posadas, also noted that:
[1It is precisely because the government could have enacted a wholesale prohibition of the underlying conduct that it is permissible for the government to take
the less intrusive step of allowing the conduct, but reducing the demand through
restrictions on advertising.
Id at 346 (emphasis in original).
7" 492 US 469 (1989).
80 Id at 477. Of the fourth prong's requirement, the Court said
78

[Olur decisions require . . . a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable;
that represents not necessarily the single best disposition but one whose scope is
"in proportion to the interest served," . . . that employs not necessarily the least
restrictive means but . . . a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective. Within those bounds we leave it to governmental decisionmakers to judge
what manner of regulation may best be employed.
Id at 480 (citations omitted).
" Central Hudson, 447 US at 584-85 (Rehnquist dissenting). Justice Rehnquist also
gave three other reasons in support of his position. First, because broadcast licenses are
state-created monopolies, the government may place limits on the use of such licenses. Id at
585, 587-88. Second, the First Amendment fully protects only political speech, not commercial speech. Id at 595-99. Third, the "final part of the Court's test leaves room for so many
hypothetical 'better' ways that any ingenious lawyer will surely seize on one of them to
secure the invalidation of what the state agency actually did." Id at 599-600.
However, other recent cases suggest that the Court is not entirely willing to defer to
legislative judgment in applying the Central Hudson test. For example, in Peel v Attorney
Registration and DisciplinaryCommission of Illinois, the Court invalidated a state statute
prohibiting lawyers from advertising themselves as being "certified" as "specialists." 496 US
91 (1990). The Court said that the "particular State rule restricting lawyers' advertising is
'broader than reasonably necessary to prevent the perceived evil.'" Id at 107 (quoting Shapero v Kentucky Bar Ass'n., 486 US 466, 472 (1988) (quoting In re R. M. J., 455 US 191,
203 (1982))). However, Peel, and the cases that it cites, deal with statutes that prohibit
potentially misleading advertising. They were not invalidated because this kind of interest is
insubstantial.Rather, they were invalidated because the asserted interests lacked evidentiary support and thus were not substantiated.
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Protecting. children from harm is one such interest, as the
Court has repeatedly held."' Nevertheless, under Central Hudson,
the policies and facts involved in each case must be examined to
determine the constitutionality of a restriction on commercial
83
speech.
IV.

ARTICLE

16

IN THE UNITED STATES

No constitutional impediment bars the United States from enacting its own version of Article 16. As this Part demonstrates, Article 16 restrictions on commercial speech would likely satisfy all
four prongs of the Central Hudson test.
A.

Non-Misleading Advertising

This Comment assumes that, in general, advertising is neither
misleading nor related to unlawful activities, and thus it qualifies
as commercial speech entitled to some measure of constitutional
protection. If this assumption is incorrect, then such advertising
can claim no constitutional protection and the*state may freely
regulate it. 4
Some children's television advocates, however, have asserted
that program- and traditional-length advertisements are "inherently deceptive" and misleading. 85 Such advertisements are deceptive because children "cannot distinguish advertisements from program content," because they "place unwarranted trust in the
salesperson," and because they lack the ability "to make informed
82 Sable Communications of California, Inc. v FCC, 492 US 115, 126 (1989); FCC v

Pacifica Foundation, 438 US 726, 749-50 (1978); Ginsberg v New York, 390 US 629, 639
(1968).
" Not all restrictions that seek to protect children are upheld under the Central Hudson test. For example, in Sable, the Court invalidated a federal statute prohibiting indecent
language in prerecorded, commercial telephone messages on the ground that the record did
not show that the restriction was not the least restrictive means to further the government's
articulated compelling interest of "protecting the physical and psychological well-being of
minors." Sable, 492 US at 126.
84 Central Hudson, 447 US at 563. Article 16 itself does not directly address this issue,
but one assumes that the EC would not deem such advertising worthy of protection.
"BSee Peggy Charren, Commercial Speech and the First Amendment: Children's Advertising: Whose Hand Rocks the Cradle?,56 U Cin L Rev 1251 (1988); Comment, Children
Watching Television Advertising: What's Wrong with this Picture?, 12 Hastings Comm &
Ent L J 495, 499-500 (1990).
Program length commercials are "programs that interweave 'noncommercial' program
content so closely with the commercial message that the entire program must be considered
commercial." Charren, 56 U Cin L Rev at 1252-53, citing Applicability of Commission Policies on Program-Length Commercials, 44 FCC2d 985 (1974).
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choices even if presented with all the relevant information."86
Thus, both program- and traditional-length commercials would fail
CentralHudson's first prong and would not be entitled to any constitutional protection.
Whether television advertising is "inherently deceptive" remains unclear.8 7 At the least, many program-length commercials
can conceivably stand on their own as valid children's programs.
Thus, in general, one may reasonably assume that advertising is
neither misleading nor related to unlawful activity.
B.

Substantial State Interest

The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that concern for the
welfare and development of children qualifies as a substantial state
interest. 8 The interests that underlie FCC regulation of indecent
broadcasts and children's television include facilitating parental
supervision of children, protecting children's physical and mental
welfare, and preserving the privacy of the home from intrusive and
pervasive television broadcasting. Congress has also regulated television advertising in order to prevent harm to children from the
overcommercialization of television.
Similarly, the EC has also recognized its substantial interest in
protecting children. The Commission specifically found that "the
protection of the physical, mental and moral development of children and young persons is in the general interest."8 Indeed, that is
the very objective cited in the preamble to Article 16. Hence, similar interests underlie United States regulations and Article 16 of
the EEC Treaty. Article 16 satisfies the second prong of Central
Hudson.

C. Directly Advances the Substantial State Interest
1. Article 16(a).

Article 16(a) states that television advertisers may "not directly exhort minors to buy a product or a service by exploiting
SO

Comment, 12 Hastings Comm & Ent L J at 499-500 (cited in note 85).

Compare Charren, 56 U Cin L Rev at 1252-53 (cited in note 85), with Versfelt, 11
Hastings Comm & Ent L J at 634 (cited in note 32).
" Sable Communications of California, Inc. v FCC, 492 US 115, 126 (1989); FCC v
Pacifica Foundation, 438 US 726, 749-50 (1978); Ginsberg v New York, 390 US 629, 639
(1968).
" Amended Prop for a Council Dir on the coordination of certain provisions laid down
by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning. the pursuit of
broadcasting activities, 44th recital, 1988 OJ at C110:10 (cited in note 14).
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their inexperience or credulity." 90 This provision directly facilitates
parental supervision of children. Arguably, parents teach children
the ways of the world, to eliminate "inexperience or credulity" and
turn them into savvy consumers. By preventing advertising that
plays upon children's naivete, government obviates the need for repeated explanations of why advertised products should not be purchased, thus reducing competition for children's allegiance."'
Article 16(a) also prohibits harmful advertising that parents
might, if given the chance, screen from their children. Thus, Article 16(a) assists parents in the task of shielding their children from
unwelcome television advertising. The legislators backing the CTA
and the FCC also seemed keen to facilitate parental screening of
program material, because they found that children do not have
the cognitive ability to distinguish between programming and advertising and that they do not possess the intellectual capacity to
evaluate the persuasive intent of advertising.
Article 16(a) addresses this concern quite effectively: if television advertising directed at children is harmful, then remedial
measures should be addressed to the source of the harm. By comparison, the time limits enacted by the CTA seem a much cruder
means of addressing these concerns.
2.

Article 16(b).

Advertising can be both educational and informative: it may
alert consumers to the availability and quality of products and services. Yet, strongly urging young consumers to buy or have bought
for them these products and services may well go beyond educating
and informing consumers. 2 Thus, Article 16(b) directs advertisers
to "not directly encourage minors to persuade their parents or
others to purchase the goods or services being advertised." 93 The

"

Council Dir 89/552, art 16, 1989 OJ at L298:28-29 (cited in note 2).

" See Comment, 12 Hastings Comm & Ent L J at 500 (cited in note 85) (children's
advertising provides exciting and fun-filled role models that children readily accept).
2 Indeed, the European Economic and Social Committee has expressed a similar concern about the "levelling down" of program quality if broadcasters are permitted to pursue
policies of maximizing advertising revenue. In other words, absent regulation, broadcasters
might shirk their informational and educational missions in the headlong pursuit of advertising revenue. See Economic & Social Committee Opinion on the Green Paper on the establishment of the common market for broadcasting, especially by satellite and cable, $ 5.6.1,
1985 OJ C303:13, 17.
"

Council Dir 89/552, art 16, 1989 OJ at L298:28-29 (cited in note 2).
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United States, by placing a similar restraint on advertisers, would
9 4
at least remind broadcasters of their duty to inform and educate
Further, Article 16(b), by regulating the content of advertisements, protects children from the subtle and not-so-subtle appeal
of television advertisers. It assists parents in supervising their children, especially when parents cannot be present to guide their children's viewing. This relieves parents of some of the burden of con-*
tinuously monitoring their children's viewing habits and of denying
their children's requests for advertised products. In so doing, such
regulation also serves several other salutary purposes: it prevents
children from acquiring a distorted understanding of the proper
way to interact with parents and others; it prevents them from
viewing their parents as merely a source for procuring advertised
products, and it prevents them from perceiving their parents as a
"repressive authority," denying them things television "has characterized as accessible and desirable."9' 5
Moreover, if it is the content of television advertising that
harms children, then limiting the amount of time available to advertisers (the CTA solution) seems a crude way to redress this
harm. Content regulation of the type proposed by Article 16(b)
presents the superior solution. Such regulation may not even harm
advertisers if it produces more informative advertising. Because informative advertising conveys facts regarding the availability and
quality of an advertised good, it may sell more of that good than
mere emotive appeals.96 Such advertising would at least make consumer decisions more rational."7 Thus, Article 16(b)'s prohibition
on advertisers-that they may not directly encourage a child to ask
his parents or others to buy an advertised product-may actually
increase the informative content of advertisements.
However, some United States broadcasters have expressed
concern that stringent regulation of advertisement content, such as
that undertaken by Article 16(b), might discourage advertisers,
which in turn might reduce the funding available for children's
programming." Yet, stringent content regulation need not drive

" This also comports well with the Children's Television Act of 1990, which stresses
that television should serve the needs of children by providing information and education.
See Children's Television Act of 1990, § 101, Pub L No 101-437, 104 Stat 996 (1990).
" Comment, 12 Hastings Comm & Ent L J at 500-01 (cited in note 85).
" See id at 500.
" However, children may be especially susceptible to emotive appeals. See notes 32, 52.
9' Comment, 12 Hastings Comm & Ent L J at 503 (cited in note 85). See also, President
Bush's Statement on the Children's Television Act of 1990, 26 Weekly Comp Pres Doc at
1612 (cited in note 35).
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advertisers away. 99 It might instead lead to a different kind of advertising, one that is more informative and less emotive. At the
least, regulating advertisement content would continue to accomplish the advertisers' primary objective-to convey information"
about the availability and quality of goods and services.1 0°
3. Article 16(c).
Article 16(c) prohibits television advertising from "exploit[ingl
the special trust minors place in parents, teachers or other persons." 101 The influence that advertising has on children may create
friction between children and their parents.0 2 Preserving the "special trust" children have in their parents assists parents in supervising their children. Without such trust, parents may find it difficult to effectively guide their children to adulthood.1 03
4. Article 16(d).
Finally, Article 16(d) forbids television advertising from "unreasonably show[ing] minors in dangerous situations.' ' 0 4 Showing
children involved in dangerous activities may induce other children
to engage in similar activities.10 5 Therefore, prohibiting the depic-

" Even if funding for children's programming suffered as a result of stringent regulation of advertisement content, the best way to remedy shortfalls might simply be more public funding. H Rep No 101-385 at 22 (cited in note 30). However, simply subsidizing children's programming, without concomitant regulation of advertisement content, would not
adequately protect those children who tune in when harmful advertising is being broadcast.
See Children's Television Act of 1990, Title II, Pub L 101-437, 104 Stat 996 (creating the
National Endowment for Children's Educational Television).
100 However, advertisers that promote products and services lacking in quality might
disappear from the market. Although this might decrease funding for children's programming, the net gain to society would seem to offset this loss. See Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 US 748, 781 (1976) (Stewart concurring) ("[T]he
elimination of false and deceptive claims [in commercial advertising] serves to promote the
one facet of commercial price and product advertising that warrants First Amendment protection-its contribution to the flow of accurate and reliable information relevant to public
and private decisionmaking."); Comment, Cutting Back on Commercial Speech Standards,
75 Iowa L Rev 1335, 1349-50 (1990) (arguing that the information function of commercial
speech is related to self-governance).
10,Council Dir 89/552, art 16, 1989 OJ at L298:28-29 (cited in note 2).
102 Comment, 12 Hastings Comm & Ent L J at 500-01 (cited in note 85), citing Federal

Trade Commission Staff Report on Television Advertising to Children 103-04 (Feb, 1978).
Commercialization of Children's Television, Hearings before the House Subcommittee on
Telecommunications and Finance, 100th Cong, 1st Sess at 320-21 (Mar 17, 1988) (cited in
note 25).
103 Comment, 12 Hastings Comm & Ent L J at 500-01 (cited in note 85).
104 Council Dir 89/552, art 16, 1989 OJ at L298:28-29 (cited in note 2).
0I More evidence is necessary before firm conclusions can be drawn about the suggestiveness of dangerous activities depicted in advertisements. Given television advertising's
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tion of such situations in advertising directly advances the state's
interest in protecting the health of children." 6
Therefore, Article 16 directly advances substantial state interests satisfying the third prong of the Central Hudson test.
D.

"Reasonable Fit" Analysis

Finally, Central Hudson requires a reasonable fit between restrictions placed on commercial speech and the purposes those restrictions are intended to serve.1 0 7 While proponents of content
regulation admit that other means may exist to assist parental supervision of children, to protect the welfare of children, and to
curb the intrusiveness of television advertising, Article 16 seems to
satisfy the reasonable fit requirement. The analysis "turns on the
nature both of the expression and of the governmental interests"
involved." °8
Even though the invalidation of some state commercial speech
restrictions in recent cases may herald a more searching inquiry
into the fit between means and ends,"0 9 the substantial state interest here-protecting the mental and physical development of children-has repeatedly been recognized by the Court and the EC.
Congress, the FCC, and commentators have also recognized this
interest, as well as the interest in assisting parental supervision of
children. Since Article 16 directly advances these substantial state
interests and directly addresses the source of potential harm, its
means seem adequately fitted to its ends. Further, the FCC's experience in regulating "indecent" programming strongly suggests that
alternatives to content regulation are simply infeasible. Thus, Article 16 would satisfy the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test
and thus be upheld as a constitutional restriction on commercial
speech.

persuasive influence on young children, though, it seems reasonable to conclude that legislation like Article 16 would guard against any potential risk.
'0' Curiously, Article 16 forbids only "unreasonably" showing children in dangerous situations. Presumably, this gives advertisers some flexibility in advertising their products or
services.
107 Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of New York v Fox, 492 US 469, 477 (1989).
"I Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v Public Service Cornm'n. of New York, 447 US
557, 563 (1980). See also, Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v Fox, 492
US 469, 480 (1989) (noting that the restriction should be "in proportion to the interest
served").
109 See Peel v Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n. of Illinois, 496 US 91
(1990).
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CONCLUSION

The United States and the European Community share a concern for the health and development of children. Both have identified television advertising as a source of potential harm. To minimize this risk, the EC has adopted Article 16. No constitutional
impediment prevents the enactment of a similar measure in the
United States. Thus, Congress may wish to follow the European
example as it attempts to devise a constitutional and adequate
means of protecting children from the risks of television
advertising.

